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United States v. Erwin and the Folly of 
Intertwined Cooperation and Plea 
Agreements 
Kevin Bennardo 
Abstract 
 
Cooperation agreements and plea agreements are separate 
and independent promises by criminal defendants to: (1) assist the 
Government in the prosecution of another person and (2) plead 
guilty. A defendant’s breach of one should not affect the 
Government’s obligation to perform under the other. All too often, 
however, these agreements are inappropriately intertwined so that 
a minor breach of the plea agreement relieves the Government of 
its obligation to move for a downward sentencing departure in 
recognition of the defendant’s substantial assistance. This 
intertwining undermines sentencing policy as set forth in the 
federal sentencing statute. Thus, a district court should continue 
to consider a defendant’s substantial assistance when imposing a 
criminal sentence even if a breach of the plea agreement alleviates 
the Government of its duty to move for a sentence reduction under 
an intertwined cooperation agreement. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                     
  Visiting Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Indiana University 
McKinney School of Law. 
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Cooperation agreements and plea agreements should be kept 
separate. They confer unrelated benefits for unrelated promises. 
A defendant’s performance—or breach—of one should not affect 
the Government’s duty to perform under the other. All too often, 
however, the two agreements are intertwined. 
As its name describes, a cooperation agreement is a promise 
by the defendant to cooperate with the Government. This 
cooperation most often comes in the form of assisting the 
Government in investigating or prosecuting another person. In 
exchange, the Government promises to confer some benefit to the 
defendant. This benefit usually comes in the form of a 
Government motion for a sentence reduction,1 for a downward 
departure in the calculation of the defendant’s advisory 
sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
(the Guidelines),2 or both. A notable incentive for many 
defendants is that a Government motion premised on substantial 
assistance permits the district court to sentence a defendant 
below an otherwise-applicable mandatory minimum sentence.3 
The main promise in a plea agreement is the defendant’s 
agreement to plead guilty to a criminal charge. A plea agreement 
may contain other promises, such as a waiver by the defendant of 
her right to appeal or to collaterally attack her conviction or 
sentence.4 In exchange, the Government may agree to dismiss or 
to not bring other charges, or to recommend a certain sentence or 
                                                                                                     
 1. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012) (permitting a court to reduce a sentence 
below the statutory minimum if the defendant provided substantial assistance 
in the investigation or prosecution of another person); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) 
(permitting a court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the defendant provided 
substantial assistance after sentencing in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person). 
 2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2013) (permitting a 
court to depart from the Guidelines if the defendant provided substantial 
assistance and providing factors for the court to consider when determining the 
extent of the departure). 
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). 
 4. See, e.g., Plea Agreement Between United States Attorney for the 
District of New Jersey and Christopher Erwin at 4, United States v. Erwin, No. 
12-cr-00364-FLW (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Erwin Plea Agreement] 
(“[T]his Office and Christopher Erwin waive certain rights to file an appeal, 
collateral attack, writ or motion after sentencing, including but not limited to an 
appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”). 
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Guidelines calculation at the sentencing hearing.5 The defendant 
and the Government may also submit a plea agreement to the 
district court with a binding sentencing recommendation, but the 
district court is not required to accept this—or any other—type of 
plea agreement.6 
Cooperation agreements and plea agreements contain 
completely independent promises: to aid in the investigation or 
prosecution of another and to plead guilty. The parties may enter 
into one without the other. However, when the parties enter into 
both, they are often inexplicably intertwined, and a defendant’s 
breach of one agreement relieves the Government of its duty to 
perform under both agreements.7 This intertwining undermines 
sentencing policy and the purposes of punishment set forth in the 
federal sentencing statute.8 The circumstances underlying the 
recent Third Circuit decision in United States v. Erwin9 provide 
an example of intertwined agreements and the resulting folly. 
In Erwin, the defendant, Christopher Erwin, executed 
separate plea and cooperation agreements with the 
Government.10 In the plea agreement, Erwin agreed to plead 
guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute oxycodone.11 Erwin’s plea agreement also 
contained an appellate waiver provision in which he promised not 
to appeal his sentence if it fell within or below the advisory range 
corresponding to offense level thirty-nine in the Guidelines.12 For 
                                                                                                     
 5. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (setting forth the permissible types of plea 
agreements in the federal system). 
 6. See id. 11(c)(1)(C), (c)(3). 
 7. See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. 
REV. 563, 567 (1999) (noting that “[i]n one light cooperation agreements may be 
seen as simply a subset of plea agreements”). 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 9. 765 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 10. Id. at 223–24. 
 11. Id. at 223; see also Erwin Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 1. 
 12. Erwin, 765 F.3d at 224; Erwin Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 9. The 
Guidelines assign an advisory imprisonment range based on the seriousness of 
the offense conduct and the defendant’s recent past criminal convictions. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.1 (2013). The “offense level” 
measures the seriousness of the offense conduct on a scale of one to forty-three. 
Id. The “criminal history category” grades the defendant’s criminal history on a 
scale of I to VI. Id. The resulting intersection of those two figures on the 
Sentencing Table yields the recommended range of imprisonment. Id. Erwin 
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its part, the Government promised in the plea agreement that it 
would not bring any further criminal charges against Erwin in 
connection with the conspiracy.13 The Government also provided 
a mutual appellate waiver—it agreed not to appeal any sentence 
that fell within or above the Guidelines range corresponding to 
offense level thirty-nine.14 
In a separate cooperation agreement, the parties agreed that 
the Government would move for a downward departure from the 
Guidelines range of imprisonment if it determined that Erwin 
had substantially assisted in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person.15 The cooperation agreement further provided 
that any breach by Erwin of either the plea agreement or the 
cooperation agreement would release the Government of its 
obligation to perform under both agreements.16 
Erwin pleaded guilty to the oxycodone trafficking conspiracy, 
and, at sentencing, the district court set Erwin’s offense level at 
thirty-nine and his criminal history category at I.17 These two 
calculations produced a Guidelines range of imprisonment of 262 
to 327 months, which the district court then reduced to 240 
months because the offense of conviction had a statutory 
maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment.18 In recognition of 
Erwin’s substantial assistance, the Government moved for a five 
offense level downward departure and the court granted the 
motion.19 Without objection, the court recalculated Erwin’s 
Guidelines range using offense level thirty-four, thereby 
                                                                                                     
agreed not to appeal his sentence if it fell at or below the range corresponding to 
offense level thirty-nine at whatever criminal history category the district court 
calculated at sentencing. Erwin, 765 F.3d at 223; Erwin Plea Agreement, supra 
note 4, at 9. 
 13. Erwin, 765 F.3d at 223; Erwin Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 1. 
 14. See Erwin Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 9. 
 15. Erwin, 765 F.3d at 224. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 225. Based on the drug quantity, Erwin’s base offense level was 
thirty-eight. He then received a four-level increase for his leadership role in the 
oxycodone conspiracy and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. 
Id. 
 18. Id. An advisory Guidelines range of imprisonment may not extend 
beyond the maximum punishment permitted by statute. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(a) (2013). 
 19. See Erwin, 765 F.3d at 225. 
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producing a range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.20 The 
district court sentenced Erwin within the Guidelines range to a 
prison term of 188 months.21 
Despite his previous promise not to appeal his sentence as 
long as it fell at or below the range corresponding to offense level 
thirty-nine, Erwin did exactly that.22 Erwin argued on appeal 
that the district court should have deducted the five offense levels 
for substantial assistance from a baseline of 240 months rather 
than starting at offense level thirty-nine.23 In its responsive brief, 
the Government argued that Erwin’s appeal violated his 
appellate waiver and sought a remand to the district court to 
allow it “to pursue its contractual remedies for breach.”24 Siding 
with the Government, the Third Circuit found that Erwin’s 
appellate argument was foreclosed by the appellate waiver 
provision in the plea agreement and remanded for resentencing.25 
The Government’s position is that Erwin’s breach relieves it of its 
obligation to seek a substantial assistance downward departure 
at Erwin’s resentencing hearing.26 Because a substantial 
assistance departure requires a Government motion, the district 
court cannot grant the departure in the absence of a motion by 
the Government.27 If the Government withholds the motion, 
Erwin’s advisory Guidelines sentence will be 240 months when he 
is resentenced rather than the range of 151 to 188 months at his 
original sentencing hearing. But, because the Guidelines are only 
advisory, the district court would remain free to exercise its 
discretion to grant a variance and impose a sentence less severe 
                                                                                                     
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. Erwin’s sentence also included three years of supervised release and 
a $100 special assessment. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 225–26. 
 24. Brief for Appellee at 19, Erwin, 765 F.3d 219 (No. 13-3407), 2014 WL 
785396. 
 25. See Erwin, 765 F.3d at 226–32.  
 26. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 24, at 28–40. 
 27. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2013). 
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than the 240 months recommended by the Guidelines.28 As of this 
writing, Erwin has yet to be resentenced.29 
In a literal sense, Erwin is getting just what he bargained 
for. By the terms of the cooperation agreement, the Government’s 
obligation to move for a substantial assistance reduction was 
contingent on Erwin keeping all of his promises under both the 
cooperation agreement and the plea agreement.30 Erwin broke 
one of the promises in his plea agreement and now the 
Government is relieved of its duties under the cooperation 
agreement. The problem with this sort of horse-trading, however, 
is that it divorces the sentencing outcome from the defendant’s 
actual conduct. In doing so, it ignores the policy rationales 
underlying federal sentencing. 
Federal statute sets forth the appropriate factors that a 
district court must consider in imposing an appropriate 
sentence.31 Under the parsimony clause, the sentence must be 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the 
enumerated goals.32 The relevant factors include the need for the 
sentence to provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and 
provide the defendant with educational training and other 
correctional treatment.33 When resentencing Erwin, the district 
court should focus on these enumerated factors rather than the 
unrelated bargains brokered in the plea and cooperation 
agreements. 
Quite simply, little has changed since Erwin’s initial 
sentencing. The fact remains that he substantially assisted the 
Government in the investigation or prosecution of at least one 
                                                                                                     
 28. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (downgrading the 
Guidelines to “advisory” status). 
 29. See Erwin, 765 F.3d at 236 n.13 (noting that, per Third Circuit protocol, 
the case must be reassigned to another district court judge for resentencing). At 
the time of this writing, Erwin had received an extension of time to file a 
petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc in front of the Third Circuit, but 
had yet to file his petition. 
 30. See Erwin Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 1. 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (listing numerous factors for sentencing 
courts to consider). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
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other individual.34 Both the Government and the district court 
agreed that the magnitude of Erwin’s assistance merited a five-
offense-level reduction.35 Returning to the sentencing factors, 
such a reduction sensibly reflects Erwin’s demonstration of his 
respect for the law and his concomitant diminished need for 
extended incapacitation or rehabilitation. Erwin earned that five-
level reduction through his substantial assistance. Based on the 
statutory sentencing factors, the reduction should not be forfeited 
by Erwin’s breach of the appellate waiver provision in his 
separate plea agreement.36 
At resentencing, the district court must determine what, if 
anything, Erwin’s breach of his appellate waiver agreement says 
about his likelihood to reoffend or his need for rehabilitation. 
Perhaps it displays a very modest lack of respect for the law, or 
perhaps it does not. Perhaps it speaks louder about the lack of 
consistency in federal appellate case law in applying the 
“miscarriage of justice” exception to the enforcement of an 
otherwise-applicable appellate waiver agreement.37 Either way, it 
should merit only a small increase in Erwin’s sentence, if any 
increase at all. 
Removing Erwin’s five-offense-level reduction for substantial 
assistance would result in a sentence “greater than necessary” to 
achieve the enumerated purposes of punishment.38 The 
Guidelines are calibrated so that an increase in six offense levels 
approximately doubles the recommended term of imprisonment.39 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Erwin, 765 F.3d at 224 (describing the nature of Erwin’s 
cooperation). 
 35. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
 37. The Third Circuit will not enforce an otherwise valid appellate waiver if 
doing so would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Khattak, 
273 F.3d 557, 562–63 (3d Cir. 2001). This standard has been criticized as vague 
and difficult to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1344 n.9 
(10th Cir. 2004) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the miscarriage-of-justice 
exception because its vagueness encourages defendants with appellate waivers 
to appeal); Kristine Malmgren Yeater, Comment, Third Circuit Appellate 
Waivers: The Mysterious Miscarriage of Justice Standard, 14 DUQ. CRIM. L.J. 94, 
103 (2010) (criticizing the Third Circuit’s failure to adequately define the 
miscarriage-of-justice exception). 
 38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (requiring that sentences not be “greater 
than necessary”). 
 39. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2013). Indeed, the 
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Increasing Erwin’s punishment so severely would significantly 
overstate the harm caused or the information learned by his 
breach of the appellate waiver provision. Thus, the district court 
should vary downwardly from the 240-month sentence 
recommended by the Guidelines because that sentence 
significantly overstates the appropriate punishment given 
Erwin’s substantial assistance to the Government. Upon 
resentencing, an appropriate sentence would remain in the 
neighborhood of Erwin’s original 188-month sentence.40 
From a contractual perspective, Erwin’s breach of the 
appellate waiver provision relieves the Government of its broader 
promise under the plea agreement to refrain from bringing other 
charges against Erwin related to the oxycodone conspiracy. 
Should it wish to do so, nothing prevents the Government from 
filing additional charges.41 This severe consequence highlights 
the additional problem created by incorporating appellate waiver 
agreements within larger plea agreements. Here, Erwin’s breach 
of a secondary agreement in the plea agreement results in his 
loss of the entire benefit of the bargain even though he upheld his 
primary promise to plead guilty. The consequence of Erwin’s 
breach sharply outweighs the nature of the breach. In order to 
impose a consequence proportional to a defendant’s breach, a 
better structure would be to separate appellate waiver provisions 
from plea agreements altogether. By separating the appellate 
waiver promise and the bargained consideration from the larger 
agreement to plead guilty, the penalty for breaching the appellate 
waiver agreement—the loss of whatever consideration was 
bargained in that agreement—would be inherently proportional 
to the severity of the breach.42 
                                                                                                     
shortest possible sentence corresponding to offense level thirty-nine (262 
months) is more than nine years longer than the shortest sentence 
corresponding to offense level thirty-four (151 months). See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 40. This statement assumes, of course, that Erwin’s original 188-month 
sentence was appropriate. 
 41. See Erwin Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 1. 
 42. For a lengthier discussion on separating appellate waiver agreements 
from plea agreements, see Kevin Bennardo, Post-Sentencing Appellate Waivers, 
48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263389. 
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The Erwin case illustrates the inappropriateness of 
intertwining promises that are fundamentally independent. The 
defendant agreed to plead guilty, to not appeal his sentence, and 
to cooperate with the Government. He upheld two of those 
promises. His breach of the third—and least significant—promise 
should not result in his loss of the entirety of the benefit of all 
three promises. A defendant’s guilty plea and cooperation with 
the Government are relevant to her sentence, regardless of 
whether the Government has any obligation to note it at 
sentencing (or resentencing, as the case may be). An unrelated 
breach of an appellate waiver provision may provide information 
relevant to sentencing as well, but on a much smaller scale. 
Fairness demands that defendants’ actions must be considered 
separately at sentencing. And, going forward, the best practice 
would be to keep separate promises separate and not intertwine 
the promises and consequences set forth in cooperation 
agreements with unrelated promises and consequences contained 
in plea agreements. 
 
 
